دوره 9، شماره 32 - ( 4-1397 )                   سال9 شماره 32 صفحات 215-179 | برگشت به فهرست نسخه ها

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Jalali O, Nasrollahi Z, Hatefi Madjumerd M. Investigating the Effect of Rewards on Individual Players' Efforts: A Behavioral Approach. jemr 2018; 9 (32) :179-215
URL: http://jemr.khu.ac.ir/article-1-1599-fa.html
جلالی ام البنین، نصراللهی زهرا، هاتفی مجومرد مجید. بررسی اثر پاداش بر تلاش فردی بازیکنان: رهیافت یک بازیِ رفتاری. تحقیقات مدلسازی اقتصادی 1397; 9 (32) :215-179

URL: http://jemr.khu.ac.ir/article-1-1599-fa.html

1- دانشگاه یزد
2- دانشگاه یزد ، nasr@yazd.ac.ir
3- دانشگاه تهران
چکیده:   (3693 مشاهده)
هدف اصلی مطالعه بررسی اثر پاداش بر رفتار بازیکنان در یک فعالیت تیمی است. در این چارچوب با انجام 12 بازی متوالی و همزمان در محیطی آزمایشگاهی اثر پاداش بر رفتار بازیکنان بررسی می‌شود. دانشجویان دانشگاه‌های یزد، جامعه مورد بررسی است و نمونه مورد بررسی 182 نفر از دانشجویان در قالب گروه‌های 2 نفره است که با توجه به انجام 12 بازی در مجموع 2184 مشاهده جمع‌آوری شده است. نتایج نشان می‌دهد که افزایش در پاداش‌های بازی، منجر به کاهش تلاش بازیکن اول در بازی می‌شود. همچنین ساختار بازی مبنی بر همزمان یا متوالی بودن تصمیم‌گیری، اثری بر تصمیم بازیکن اول ندارد؛ اما تصمیم بازیکن دوم را تحت تأثیر قرار می‌دهد. علاوه بر این  اثرات متقابل پاداش و ساختار فقط بر تصمیم بازیکن دوم اثرگذار است. نتایج این مطالعه، رخداد چرخش انگیزه‌ها به ازای افزایش پاداش‌های پولی را تأیید کرد.
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نوع مطالعه: كاربردي | موضوع مقاله: سایر
دریافت: 1396/6/9 | پذیرش: 1397/4/31 | انتشار: 1397/6/21

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