Journal of Economic Modeling Research

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Monetary wide range of sanctions has been established against Iran in recent years by European :::::union::::: and United States. These sanctions have been targeted   Iran energy and oil industry. Although, these types of sanctions are not new on Iran and Iran is familiar whit them since oil nationalization movement. This paper studies these sanctions effects on Iran in recent years and tries to assess the possible strategies with game theory. In order to achieve this proposed, three players are introduced: Iran, Saudi Arabia and United States, and then a model have been established. At the following, the model was solved and Nash equilibrium obtained for each one. Each of three  players , United States , Saudi Arabia and  Iran choose their strategy, respectively, pressure reduction, cooperation and cooperation. At the end of this study, the impact of oil sanction on Iran's sales, has been shown. Eventually, it was seen even with great increasing in world oil prices, Iran's in come has been downward.

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This paper implements an approach to examine economic problems in which rational agents interact in dynamic markets. We use evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling in tandem as a means to address intertemporal problems that display evolutionary attributes. This study examines the behavior of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the global oil markets during the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to control global oil markets during this period.. To address this, a symmetric evolutionary game theory model is used to examine the behavior of OPEC agents as they learned to take control of their resources. An agent-based modeling approach employs computational power to implement the evolutionary game and provide detailed results. It is shown that OPEC’s behavior over the period is dependent on the growth of petroleum reserves within the member nations. Increasing realizations of natural resource reserves spur increased rates of learning and experimentation, and this enables the cartel to act cooperatively and capture control of global petroleum markets. If reserves are kept constant, OPEC lingers at a state in which the cartel does not come to dominate world oil markets.