Dr Ghahraman Abdoli, Dr Vahid Majed,
Volume 3, Issue 7 (3-2012)
Abstract
In the past decades, a range of discussions has been formed on coalition theory in economics and international sciences. The focus of this discussion is that in the absence of a superior power, and while some players want to expand their authorities, is it possible to cooperate or not. These theories agree on the principle that if such condition be a sequential game, cooperation will be permanent only if the players are patient enough. In the real world, there are many partnerships between groups that don’t have a same patience, i.e. the discount factor isn’t equal for each of the members. OPEC is an example of those groups which composed of members with different discount factor.
This paper investigates the future of OPEC members and their different discount factors. So, cooperative theory is used to analyze the behavior of OPEC members using panel data techniques. Results show that a fixed effects model is appropriate to explain OPEC member’s behavior. According to the model, the amount of marketed crude oil by members has positive relationship with stocks and sales in the previous period and also there is a negative relationship between the amount of marketed oil and square of proven reserves per capita. The results show that bargaining and negotiation between some members to achieve agreement rapidly and also relents or blackmails guarantees OPEC Survival.
Mohammad Hossein Mahdavi- Adeli, Mohammad Ali Falahi, Ghahraman Abdoli, Jalal Dehnavi,
Volume 5, Issue 15 (3-2014)
Abstract
Establishment of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Tehran in 2001 has proved to be one of the most important changes in the gas market. Establishment of the forum has sparked the concern among the consuming countries that a cartel is being formed in the gas market, resulting in the disturbance of supply security and gas price rise. Evidence so suggests the forum is facing fundamental obstacles to form a cartel or any other influential institution. On the other hand, considering the remarkable fall in gas prices during last months, it is necessary to present a model for determining the GECF Members Gas Export Quotas to decrease the gas supply and to increase gas prices. In this paper, we present a model which if it is applied by the GECF members we can expect that gas prices will increase. Hence in this paper first we present two mechanisms for determining the GECF member’s quotas, then considering the current situation of the members in natural gas market the optimal rationing mechanism selected. Besides, for determining the total optimal amount of production in each period as optimal total export of forum two different methods present. The first is more complicated but more accurate.
