Showing 8 results for Game Theory
Dr Ghahraman Abdoli, Dr Vahid Majed,
Volume 3, Issue 7 (3-2012)
Abstract
In the past decades, a range of discussions has been formed on coalition theory in economics and international sciences. The focus of this discussion is that in the absence of a superior power, and while some players want to expand their authorities, is it possible to cooperate or not. These theories agree on the principle that if such condition be a sequential game, cooperation will be permanent only if the players are patient enough. In the real world, there are many partnerships between groups that don’t have a same patience, i.e. the discount factor isn’t equal for each of the members. OPEC is an example of those groups which composed of members with different discount factor.
This paper investigates the future of OPEC members and their different discount factors. So, cooperative theory is used to analyze the behavior of OPEC members using panel data techniques. Results show that a fixed effects model is appropriate to explain OPEC member’s behavior. According to the model, the amount of marketed crude oil by members has positive relationship with stocks and sales in the previous period and also there is a negative relationship between the amount of marketed oil and square of proven reserves per capita. The results show that bargaining and negotiation between some members to achieve agreement rapidly and also relents or blackmails guarantees OPEC Survival.
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Volume 4, Issue 14 (12-2013)
Abstract
The Iranian electricity industry has been restructured following the global experiences. The main objective of restructuring is transition from natural monopoly towards competition in order to improve efficiency. Currently, the Iranian electricity market is performing as imperfect competition and Pay-as-Bid (PAB) auctions are the major trade mechanism in this market. This paper proves that Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is an appropriate approach to analyze behavior of the Iranian electricity market. Isfahan electricity market has been considered as a case study in which SFE is applied (regarding marginal cost estimation as well as demand uncertainty). The derived SFE indicates that there is major difference between SFE and Nash equilibrium.
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Volume 5, Issue 15 (3-2014)
Abstract
The
unavoidable consequences of increased demand and decreasing water resources and
Deduction rainfall and drought is caused to arise disutes among water user in
recent years.
On
the other hand, vital need of agriculture sector to water and developing
industry sector in Isfahan, have increased competition between water users of
industry sector and agriculture sector. In this paper, we use game theory for
optimal allocation water resources zayande rud basin. Amount of optimal
allocation from zayande rud basin determine by using optimal pareto curve and
four conflict solutions For each of sector with enivironment and for game two
persons between mentioned sectors over 1379-1388 years. in three games
''industy sector and environment'' and ''agriculture sector and environment''
and ''agriculture sector and industry sector'' find out that allocation water
resources isn't optimal between mentioned sectors over 1379-1388 years. After deduction of drinking water, the resulting
of game two persons between agriculture and industry sector is share of
industry and share of agriculture sector is 85.82% and 14.18%, ,respectively
in order to maximize total benefit Isfahan. on the other hand,
estimation economic value of water in two sector determine water price in
Agricultural sector 13010 rials per M3 and in Industry sector
6001.95 rials per M3 by application linear programming and residual
imputation approach. According to the large difference between the actual price
of water and tariff set by Ministry of Power for agriculture sector and the results
of game theory, it is proposed that give more value to the industry sector, Because it
consume less water than agriculture and we use innovative methods for irigation
in agriculture sector, so that we prevent from wastage of water resources in
this sector.
Marzieh Khakestari, Navid Nazari Adli,
Volume 6, Issue 21 (10-2015)
Abstract
Monetary wide range of sanctions has been established against Iran in recent years by European :::::union::::: and United States. These sanctions have been targeted Iran energy and oil industry. Although, these types of sanctions are not new on Iran and Iran is familiar whit them since oil nationalization movement. This paper studies these sanctions effects on Iran in recent years and tries to assess the possible strategies with game theory. In order to achieve this proposed, three players are introduced: Iran, Saudi Arabia and United States, and then a model have been established. At the following, the model was solved and Nash equilibrium obtained for each one. Each of three players , United States , Saudi Arabia and Iran choose their strategy, respectively, pressure reduction, cooperation and cooperation. At the end of this study, the impact of oil sanction on Iran's sales, has been shown. Eventually, it was seen even with great increasing in world oil prices, Iran's in come has been downward.
Marzieh Khakestari, Sahar Joleini, Ahmad Ameli,
Volume 9, Issue 31 (3-2018)
Abstract
This paper implements an approach to examine economic problems in which rational agents interact in dynamic markets. We use evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling in tandem as a means to address intertemporal problems that display evolutionary attributes. This study examines the behavior of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the global oil markets during the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to control global oil markets during this period.. To address this, a symmetric evolutionary game theory model is used to examine the behavior of OPEC agents as they learned to take control of their resources. An agent-based modeling approach employs computational power to implement the evolutionary game and provide detailed results. It is shown that OPEC’s behavior over the period is dependent on the growth of petroleum reserves within the member nations. Increasing realizations of natural resource reserves spur increased rates of learning and experimentation, and this enables the cartel to act cooperatively and capture control of global petroleum markets. If reserves are kept constant, OPEC lingers at a state in which the cartel does not come to dominate world oil markets.
Omolbanin Jalali, Zahra Nasrollahi, Madjid Hatefi Madjumerd,
Volume 9, Issue 32 (7-2018)
Abstract
The main goal of the study is to examine the effect of rewards on the behavior of players in a team activity. In this framework, by performing 12 sequential and simultaneous games in a laboratory environment examine the rewarding effect on players' behavior. Students from Yazd universities surveyed and the sample of 182 students is in the form of two groups, which collected in total for 2184 matches in 12 games. The results show that the increase in game rewards leads to a reduction in the player's first attempt in the game. Also, the structure of the game for simultaneous or sequential decision making does not affect the decision of the first player, but the decision of the second player is affected. In addition, the reciprocal effects of rewards and structure only affect the decision of the second player.
Seyed Parviz Jalili Kamju, Ramin Khochiani,
Volume 11, Issue 39 (3-2020)
Abstract
Solving the Water conflict and optimal allocation of common water resources are the most important service of cooperative game theory to water economics. Zayandehrud basin is the most important disputed basin in several neighboring provinces in the first class basin of Iran's central plateau. The purpose of this research is to use the game theory with application of Bankruptcy approach (conflicting claims) in order to optimally allocate surface and underground water resources in the Zayandehrud basin, with regard to Zayandehrud need(tourism sector demand), water transfer to Yazd and Kashan, Gavkhoni wetland water use and demand of three sectors: drinking, mining, and agriculture. In order to estimate the river natural water right (tourism sector demand), the Montana method (tenant) was used under three different scenarios: weak, acceptable and optimal tenant during the period 1963-2017, which was 77.7, 130.5, and 466.5 m3 respectively yearly estimated. The conflicting claims theory in various scenarios for the river water right (tourism sector) showed that in all three proposed scenarios based on five different bankruptcy theory rules, Proportional, Constrained Equal Wards, Constrained Equal Losses, Talmud, Random Arrival, CEA rule was the most desirable method for 5 sectors (except agriculture). In order to choose a more equitable method, the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve were used which indicated that CEA rule has less inequality than other rules. Thus, regard to the increasing demand gap in the Zayandehrud Basin, water allocation based on the criteria of bankruptcy theory is proposed.
Marzieh Rassaf, Dr Parviz Rostamzadeh, Dr Karim Eslamlueian, Dr Ebrahim Hadian,
Volume 12, Issue 43 (3-2021)
Abstract
After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the capture of the spy nest, the West, and especially the United States, in addition to pursuing other tools, has also used the tools of sanctions and has implemented many sanctions against Iran. One type of sanctions is oil sanctions, which were imposed to force Iran to join the international community. The US and its allies' embargo on Iranian oil affects the variables of the Iranian and world economies. For this reason, a computable five-zone global trade model (GTAP) is used to calculate the implications of the game tree between the three independent actors of the United States, the European Union, and Iran. The closing of the GTAP model has been changed according to the assumptions used. The results show that the US, Iran and major oil buyers from Iran are damaged by the sanctions. This damage is exacerbated by increasing oil restrictions. With the escalation of sanctions, the European Union is also gaining negative welfare. In the Nash equilibrium, the United States and the European Union will choose weak sanctions, and Iran will try to circumvent the sanctions. Due to the economic costs of oil sanctions against Iran, the lack of full understanding between the United States and Europe, and Iran's efforts to circumvent sanctions, it seems that the United States will not be able to reduce Iran's oil exports to zero.
